Montgomery and the “new” test for consenting

Until 11th March 2015, following the approach in Sidaway[1], the question of whether or not there was a breach of duty in the manner in which a person was consented for treatment (and the advice and warnings given)  required application of the Bolam[2] test and would be decided primarily on the basis of expert medical evidence.  Therefore a doctor was required to follow the practice of a responsible body of medical practitioners in the relevant field, and would only be liable in damages if proved to be outside that practice, although Bolitho[3] might in an appropriate case provide a safety valve if the practice was found to be unreasonable and not standing up to rational analysis.  Pearce[4] also illustrated a way round Bolam where the patient had not been informed of a ‘significant risk’ which would affect the judgment of a ‘reasonable’ patient.

For a considerable number of years the GMC Guidelines on consenting[5] have provided doctors with clear guidance as to what information is required to be given to a patient prior to treatment and how information should be provided.  The Guidelines do not claim to be exhaustive, but the principles are to be applied in the doctor’s practice (and it would be a bold doctor, one would have thought, to ignore them, if for no other reason than for fear of professional censure).

(i)        The doctor should not make assumptions about the information a patient might want or need, or the clinical or other factors a patient might consider significant.[6]

(ii)       The doctor must give a patient the information she wants or needs about the potential benefits, risks and burdens and the likelihood of success for each option[7] and should not withhold information unless believing that giving it would cause the patient serious harm, which is something more than the patient becoming upset or deciding to refuse treatment.[8]

(iii)     Patients must be told if treatment might result in a serious adverse outcome, that is an outcome resulting in death, permanent or long term physical disability or disfigurement, medium or long-term pain or admission to hospital, or other outcomes with a long-term or permanent effect on a patient’s employment, social or personal life, even if the likelihood is small.[9]

(iv)      Information must be given in a balanced way, avoiding bias, explaining the expected benefits as well as the potential burdens and risks.[10]

The GMC also provides guidance as to the nature of the relationship between doctors and patients in Good Medical Practice which requires doctors to –

work in partnership with patients.  Listen to, and respond to, their concerns and preferences. Give patients the information they want or need in a way they can understand.  Respect patients’ right to reach decision with you about their treatment and care.’

That advice is echoed in the process described in the GMC’s Patients and Doctors making Decisions Together:

The doctor explains the options to the patient, setting out the potential benefits, risks, burdens and side effects of each option, including the option to have no treatment.  The doctor may recommend a particular option which they believe to be best for the patient, but they must not put pressure on the patient to accept their advice.  The patient weighs up the potential benefits, risks and burdens of the various options as well as any non-clinical issues that are relevant to them.  The patient decides whether to accept any of the options and, if so, which one.’[11]

In practice the application of the law has evolved since Sidaway and this was reflected, for example, in the Court of Appeal judgments in Chester v Afshar.[12]  Given the GMC Guidelines which a doctor is required to follow, the surprise must be that it has taken until 2015 for the law itself finally to catch up.  In Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC (and in which the GMC as an intervener was represented) the Supreme Court unanimously overruled the majority decision in the House of Lords’ decision in Sidaway.  Bolam is no longer applicable to consenting.  The law now is that:

An adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken.  The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments.  The test of materiality is whether in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.[13]

In addressing this duty of care:

(i)        The assessment of the materiality of risk is not a question of percentages, therefore, but is fact sensitive to the characteristics of the patient in question.

(ii)       The process is a dialogue, between patient and doctor, so information must be provided comprehensibly for the particular patient.

(iii)     It will be rare that a doctor can justify withholding information on the grounds that the information would be detrimental to the health of the patient.

Most significantly the court will no longer have to find good reasons for  rejecting medical expert evidence which condones the particular practice of the doctor as being within the practice of a responsible body of medical practitioners in the relevant field, but, as with most issues of negligence outside medical practice, will decide the issue of negligence on the facts of the case, applying the test set out in Montgomery.  Expert medical evidence as to established practice will no longer be determinative of liability.  The law will expect that prior to treatment a patient will be made aware of any risks (i) which a reasonable person in the patient’s position, or (ii) which the doctor should be aware that that patient, would be likely to consider significant.

[Who or what is medico-legal minder?  Terms and conditions apply]

[1] Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871

[2] Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582

[3] Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232

[4] Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] PIQR P 53

[5] Patients and Doctors making Decisions Together (June 2008).  The previous edition of 1998 was to similar effect

[6] Paragraph 8

[7] Paragraph 9

[8] Paragraph 16

[9] Paragraph 32

[10] Paragraph 33

[11] Paragraph 5

[12] Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41

[13] Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC11 para 87

The Jackson Reforms and the Competent Medico-legal Expert

The issue

The ‘Jackson reforms’ in civil court procedure were introduced over the period 2013 to 2015.  Extended ‘tracks’, fixed fees, costs budgets and non-recoverability of success fees have forced lawyers to take a close look at the costs incurred in presenting an injury claim and how most efficiently to put the claim together.  The medical report remains essential, providing the foundations of much of the claim.

A sub-standard medical report will result in damages being undervalued and in time, which will not be remunerated, being wasted by the legal team in interpreting the report and seeking clarification or amendments.  Most claims never go to a disputed hearing, but the report, as interpreted or understood by the parties’ representatives, will be used to assess the strength and value of a claim, and to negotiate settlement.

The lawyer dissatisfied with the report is likely to be prevented by the court from obtaining another medical opinion and in any event will not recover the cost of doing so.

Competent medico-legal reports

Many medical reports prepared for civil litigation, whether obtained through a medical reporting agency or direct from a clinician, are not fit for purpose.  Those failings vary from the subtle to the gross.

While it is expected that the expert understands the requirements of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), on which most training is centred, and will have complied with them, an expert has also to understand his/her role in the litigation process and how the medical report is used by lawyers and the court.  The expert must also comply with the GMC guidelines, to understand exactly what questions the clinician is being asked to answer and to use language and terminology that will be readily understood by a non-medical audience.

Therefore the expert must, for example, address issues such as:

  • How long will the present effect and consequences of the injury probably continue?
  • What restrictions in activity does the claimant have as a consequence of the accident and what is the likely impact on possible future employment of such restrictions?
  • As a result of the injury what is the percentage risk of requiring an operation in a particular number of years from now?

 Only then is a proper valuation of the claim possible.  Failing to address these issues properly puts the expert in breach of duty to the court  to help the court on matters within the expert’s expertise, in breach of duty to the client  to use reasonable skill and care in providing his/her services in writing a report, and in breach of a professional duty.

A competent medico-legal expert is one who understands the purpose of the medical report, the issues that the lawyer needs addressed, and the language which will convey that.  However no general accreditation system exists to guarantee that standard or to give lawyers confidence in the selection of an expert.

Conclusion

Effective, efficient and economic case management by lawyers requires such competent expert opinion.  A lawyer is entitled to an expert who can display a public mark of the expert’s understanding, not simply of the CPR, but of the requirements of high quality medico-legal work which adds real value to the party’s position in the litigation and which can be used effectively and economically.  Sub-standard reports are increasingly likely to be rejected and clinicians ignore the lawyers’ requirements at their peril.

[Who or what is medico-legal minder?  Terms and conditions apply]